

Message Text

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TAGS: ENRG, US, EEC, MNUC, TECH
SUBJECT: US-EURATOM NEGOTIATIONS

REFS: (A) STATE 11013 (B) LONDON 6806 (C) PARIS 14166

1. I CONVEYED SUBSTANCE REFTEL A TO BRUNNER MAY 3. HE WAS APPRECIATIVE, THOUGHT POSITION WOULD STRENGTHEN HIS CASE FOR TRYING ONCE AGAIN TO FORCE ISSUE, AND SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL WERE POSITION MADE KNOWN IN BONN AS WELL AS IN PARIS.

2. BRUNNER WAS DISAPPOINTED AT OUTCOME OF COREPER DISCUSSION LAST WEEK OF NEGOTIATING SITUATION. COMMISSION REP HAD MADE CASE, FRENCH HAD SAID NO, AND MEMBER STATES HAD LET DISCUSSION END INCONCLUSIVELY. HE WAS PARTICULARLY DISAPPOINTED AT GERMAN POSITION SINCE HE HAD THOUGHT GENSCHER HAD AGREED WITH HIM THAT MATTERS SHOULD BE PRESSED AHEAD AND THAT AMBASSADOR SIGRIST WOULD BE SO INSTRUCTED. HOWEVER, SIGRIST AVOIDED TAKING POSITION BY SIMPLE TACTIC OF LEAVING COREPER BEFORE ITEM WAS REACHED ON DAY'S AGENDA. BRUNNER SPECULATES GENSCHER MAY WANT
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TO TEST WATERS WITH FRENCH BILATERALLY AND HE RECOGNIZES THAT GERMANS WOULD LIKE TO AVOID ROW WITH FRENCH IF POSSIBLE.

3. I PROBED BRUNNER CONCERNING HIS ASSESSMENT OF FRENCH MOTIVES AND HEARD NOTHING NEW EXCEPT FOR THOUGHT THAT FRENCH MIGHT BE PREPARING A WAY TO MOVE BACK FROM FULL

PARTICIPATION IN INFCE.

4. I ASKED HOW HE THOUGHT COMMUNITY MEMBER STATES WOULD FARE IF NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOT BEGUN BEFORE END OF INFCE. ROLF MOEHLER, BRUNNER'S CHEF DE CABINET, INTERJECTED THAT SITUATION WOULD BECOME IMPOSSIBLE. EURATOM SUPPLY AGENCY HAS LOOKED AT QUESTION AND CONCLUDES THAT WITHIN SIX TO EIGHT MONTHS NEED FOR BOTH HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM AND FOR LOW ENRICHED FUEL WOULD BE SEEN AS CRITICAL. FRENCH MIGHT BE ABLE TO SUPPLY AT A PRICE NEEDED 350 KILOS OF HEU BUT OVER 300 TONS OF FUEL FOR POWER REACTORS NEEDED THIS FALL COULD PROBABLY COME ONLY FROM THE US. SHORTAGES WOULD BE MOST CRITICAL IN GERMANY WITH SOME EVENTUAL EFFECTS IN BELGIUM, HOLLAND, AND ITALY. SINCE THERE ARE NO REQUIREMENTS FOR US MATERIAL FROM FRANCE, UK, DENMARK, AND IRELAND, THESE COUNTRIES COULD AFFORD TO WAIT.

5. WHILE BRUNNER HAS NOT MADE UP HIS MIND, HE TENDS TO VIEW THAT COMMISSION SHOULD RAISE ISSUE AGAIN IN COREPER AND TRY TO FORCE A DISCUSSION AT JUNE 6 FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT GENSCHER MIGHT PROBE DE GUIRINGAUD AT INFORMAL RETREAT SESSION IN DENMARK TOWARDS END OF MAY. BRUNNER INDICATED THAT IF COMMISSION DECISION WAS TO TRY TO FORCE ISSUE, A NEW DRAFT REPLY, I.E., ONE DIFFERENT FROM THE POSITION REJECTED BY THE FRENCH EVEN THOUGH ACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER EIGHT MEMBER STATES, WOULD CONFIDENTIAL

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BE REQUIRED. HE DID NOT SAY ANYTHING ABOUT WHAT ITS NATURE MIGHT BE.

6. COMMENT; BRUNNER CLEARLY IS WORRIED ABOUT INDUSTRY PRESSURES HE CAN SEE BUILDING LATER IN THE YEAR ON HIM, THE COMMISSION, AND THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT IF A FORMULA IS NOT FOUND WHICH WILL PERMIT US EXPORTS TO GO FORWARD. HE IS ALSO WORRIED ABOUT THE APPARENT LACK OF CONCERN AMONGST THE MEMBER STATES. I DID NOT TELL HIM ABOUT BRITISH VIEWS AS EXPRESSED BY HANNAY AND WILMSHURST (REFTEL B) SINCE IT WOULD HARDLY HAVE REASSURED HIM. INDEED IT SURPRISED ME SINCE I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT THE BRITS KNEW WE EARLIER CONSIDERED AND REJECTED A FORMULATION ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT TO WHAT HANNAY IS NOW URGING ON US AS A FALLBACK POSITION. SINCE I ASSUME WE STILL COULD NOT RESUME LICENSING OF FUEL WERE THE COMMUNITY MERELY TO REPLY (AND THE FRENCH WOULD AGREE TO SUCH RESOLUTION) THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE "ON THE BASIS OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF INFCE", I.E., ONLY AFTER INFCE, IT MIGHT BE WELL TO MAKE THIS CLEAR IN LONDON AND BONN AND PERHAPS ELSEWHERE BEFORE SOMETHING ELSE GOES WRONG.

7. WHILE MY OWN DISPOSITION IS TO LET BRUNNER AND THE MEMBER STATES DECIDE ON WHETHER OR NOT TO SEEK A DISCUSSION BY FOREIGN MINISTERS ON JUN 6, IF WASHINGTON THINKS DIFFERENTLY, LET ME KNOW AND I'LL PUSH EITHER FOR OR AGAINST.

8. FINALLY, I THINK A HIGH LEVEL EFFORT TO FIND OUT MORE ABOUT FRENCH THINKING IS ESSENTIAL. THE CONVERSATION WITH SOUTOU FORESEEN IN REFTEL C STRIKES ME AS A GOOD WAY TO BEGIN. HINTON

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